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Exclusionary Zoning of Group Homes in Ohio
In three cases,1 each decided on July 30, 1980, the Ohio Supreme Court
denied challenges to the validity of local zoning ordinances that excluded
family and group rehabilitative homes from single family residential districts.
By upholding these local zoning restrictions, the court granted local commun-
ities the power to override the state's professed goal of establishing commun-
ity based rehabilitation centers and effectively curtailed the integration and
deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill, the mentally retarded, and other
disadvantaged citizens 2 Although the Ohio Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged the validity of using zoning in Ohio to create a "sanctuary for people, ' 3
such a sanctuary is seemingly open only to the "normal" members of society.
Those stigmatized by labels of mental or social disability have no sanctuary
but the institution.
This Comment will examine the decisions in Brownfield v. State,4 Garcia
v. Siffrin Residential Association, and Carroll v. Washington Township
Zoning Commission, in which the Ohio Supreme Court established new
policies and legal theories that effectively disarmed both private efforts and
statewide legislative attempts to nullify local restrictive zoning schemes.
According to these cases, municipalities may disregard the mandates of the
General Assembly with impunity and rely upon the courts to uphold highly
restrictive and parochial zoning schemes. This Comment will also examine
the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Saunders v. Clark County Zoning
Department,7 which was rendered nine months after Brownfield, Garcia, and
Carroll. A decision more commendable for its result than its legal reasoning,
Saunders impliedly overrules Carroll. Despite the promise of Saunders, how-
ever, the Ohio Supreme Court has yet to erase the shadow cast by Brownfield,
1. Brownfield v. State, 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 407 N.E.2d 1365 (1980); Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Ass'n, 63
Ohio St. 2d 259, 407 N.E.2d 1369 (1980); Carroll v. Washington Township Zoning Comrnm'n, 63 Ohio St. 2d 249,
408 N.E.2d 191 (1980).
2. Brownfield v. State, 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 407 N.E.2d 1365 (1980), dealt with placement of residents of the
Western Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation Center into a halfway house in Akron, Ohio. Garcia v. Siffin Residen-
tial Ass'n, 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 407 N.E.2d 1369 (1980), involved the establishment of a residential facility for
mentally retarded persons in Stark County, Ohio. Carroll v. Washington Township Zoning Comm'n, 63 Ohio St.
2d 249, 408 N.E.2d 191 (1980), concerned the location and operation of a foster home placed out of the Richiand
County Childrens Services.
3. Village of Belie Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9(1974). This landmark case concerned a zoning ordinance
restricting occupancy of homes in a single-family residential district to those related by blood, marriage, or
adoption, or to no more than two unrelated persons. The ordinance was declared to be a constitutional exercise
of zoning laws in order to protect the quality of life by eliminating uses that might contribute to increased noise,
traffic congestion, and the deterioration of a family-type environment.
4. 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 407 N.E.2d 1365 (1980). See the discussion of Brownfield in text accompanying
notes 30-51 infra.
5. 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 407 N.E.2d 1369 (1980). See the discussion of Garcia in text accompanying notes
51-111 infra.
6. 63 Ohio St. 2d 249, 408 N.E.2d 191 (1980). See the discussion of Carroll in text accompanying notes
112-36 infra.
7. 66 Ohio St. 2d 259,421 N.E.2d 152 (1981). See the discussion of Saunders in text accompanying notes
137-55 infra.
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Garcia, and Carroll, and one may still confidently predict that certain "un-
desirables" will not soon be moving into "the house next door."
I. BACKGROUND
A. Zoning
Zoning is a systematic regulation of land use and development employed
to restrict or direct the uses to which an owner may employ his property! It is
a valid exercise of the local government's police power to regulate land use
for the promotion of public health, safety, morals, and general welfare? The
zoning laws passed in the early twentieth century were designed to regulate
height, use, structure, and location of buildings within classified districts of a
municipality or other local political subdivisions.'0
Since deciding the landmark case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co.,t t which established that zoning may be validly employed to control land
use and may diminish the value of private property without constituting a
"taking" in violation of the due process guarantee, the United States
Supreme Court has heard few cases that have raised constitutional challenges
to zoning schemes.' 2 Nevertheless, the Court has made significant pro-
nouncements regarding the use of zoning. The power to zone "is not confined
to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places," but can be employed to
establish a quiet sanctuary in which to raise families. 3 The Court has held that
zoning has its limits: "Legislatures may not, under the guise of the police
power, impose restrictions that are unnecessary and unreasonable upon the
use of private property or the pursuit of useful activities."' 4 A zoning restric-
tion that lacks a substantial relation to public health or general welfare will
generally not be upheld as a valid or reasonable exercise of the police power. 5
These concerns are echoed in the lower federal courts and the state courts,
where there has been considerable zoning law activity.
6
Zoning, a tool capable of producing much that is beneficial to the quality
of community life, is, like all social and political strategies, capable also of
producing much that is harnful and malignant. Zoning laws designed to ex-
8. 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 1.13 (2d ed. 1976).
9. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
10. Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925). See also Comment, Constitutional Law-
Municipal Ordinance Limiting Occupancy of Homeowner's Dwelling to Certain Family Members Violative of
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause: Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 21 HOW. L.J. 645 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Constitutional Law].
11. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The Court held that classification of land to allow certain uses only in certain areas
was constitutional and that any consequent diminution of property value due to the prohibition of a certain use
did not constitute a taking of property without just compensation. Id. at 396.
12. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962);
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116
(1928); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
13. Village of Belie Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
14. Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121 (1928).
15. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Froelich v. City of Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124
N.E. 212 (1919).
16. Comment, Constitutional Law, supra note 10, at 645.
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clude people on the basis of racial or economic prejudice have been attempted
and have failed.17 Courts have emphatically disapproved the invidious use of
zoning laws to deny fundamental rights, particularly to many "discrete and
insular minorities"' 8 susceptible to discrimination by a politically powerful
majority. 9 The mentally ill, the developmentally disabled, and juvenile wards
of the court, classified by certain immutable characteristics beyond their
power to control or correct, however, have not yet received the uniform
protection from exclusionary zoning schemes afforded to racial minorities.
This is especially evident in Ohio after the decisions in Brownfield, Garcia,
and Carroll.
B. Treatment of the Mentally Retarded and Mentally Ill
Custodial institutionalization was the predominant method of treating
mentally, physically, and socially disadvantaged persons throughout much of
the first half of this century.20 The belief that these "afflicted" persons should
be removed from society and locked up in secure facilities arose for a variety
of reasons: fear, ignorance, disgust, and guilt, among others2 New interest
and research into the causes and treatment of mental retardation in the begin-
ning of the second half of this century, however, provoked social reform in
the mental health professions. 2
The failure of traditional treatment, along with overcrowding of institu-
tions and rising costs associated with institutional treatment, has prompted
consideration of alternative care programs, generally labeled habilitation or
normalization. Habilitation involves placing institutionalized persons under
17. For a thorough analysis of exclusionary zoning schemes, see Rubinowitz, Exclusionary Zoning: A
Wrong in Search of a Remedy, 6 J.L. REF. 625 (1973).
18. See U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), where the Court stated that the review
applied to governmental restrictions upon fundamental rights will be upon an independent examination of the
facts purporting to provide the rational basis for the law. Fundamental rights, while not defined with any
specificity, represent those values essential to individual liberty. When laws impinge upon these clearly identifi-
able liberties, against the politically powerless minorities, the Court will make a substantive review of the law.
See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 416-19 (1978).
19. Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970), affg 296 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Okla. 1969);
Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'g 314
F. Supp. 967 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (low income housing); Sisters of Providence v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396
(N.D. II1. 1971) (low income housing); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'dper curiam, 457
F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972) (low income housing); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F.
Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971) (low income
housing); Duffcon Concrete Products v. Borough of Cresskill, I N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949) (commercial
enterprise); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (1971) (low
income housing); Molino v. Borough of Glassboro, 116 N.J. Super. 195, 281 A.2d 401 (1971) (apartment
housing); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) (apartment housing).
20. See D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM (1971), for a discussion of the development of
the institution in the United States.
21. A thorough analysis of the treatment of the mentally retarded can be found in W. WOLFENSBERGER,
The Origin and Nature of Our Institutional Models, in CHANGING PATrERNS IN RESIDENTIAL SERVICES FOR
THE MENTALLY RETARDED 1 (R. Kugel and W. Wolfensberger eds. 1969). See also P. FRIEDMAN, THE
RIGHTS OF MENTALLY RETARDED PERSONS 15 (1976).
22. Mason and Menaloscino, The Right to Treatment for Mentally Retarded Citizens: An Evolving Legal
and Scientific Interface, 10 U. CREIGHTON L. REV. 124 (1976).
23. Id. at 139.
1982]
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supervisory care within small family-style homes in a community. The group
functions as a family, sharing chores, cooking, eating, and recreational past-
times, approximating the activities of a normal biological family.24
Legislatures and courts have followed the trend towards deinstitutional-
ization led by social service reformers. Numerous judicial decisions demon-
strate approval of the legislative demands that the state seek out the least
restrictive means of treatment and that the treatment itself must be forth-
coming upon institutionalization.'s
In spite of reforms in both laws and social services, local attitudes have
resisted change. Willing to support community rehabilitation homes in the
abstract, many communities are reluctant to put into practice the theory of
family or group home treatment.26 Misconceptions and fears still present a
formidable barrier to the achievement of habilitation goals. Community re-
sistance is often evidenced through restrictive zoning laws that narrowly de-
fine the "family" in single family zones or impose limits on the numbers of
people living together as a single housekeeping unit if unrelated by blood,
marriage, or adoption. Some state court cases have shown, through broadly
inclusive interpretations of zoning restrictions,28 resistance to the exclusion of
group homes. After the decision by the United States Supreme Court in
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,29 these cases have seldom served as preced-
ent to strike down exclusionary zoning laws.
Against this background, the Ohio Supreme Court has responded to the
conflicting interests of communities who resist neighborhood habilitation and
of the state, whose duties include providing the most effective social and
mental health care. The court's message in Brownfield, Garcia, and Carroll
seemed clear: habilitation homes were not to be located in the single family
residential community.
24. Comment, Exclusionary Zoning and Its Effects on Group Homes in Areas Zoned for Single Family
Dwellings, 24 KAN. L. REV. 677, 680 (1976).
25. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Welsch
v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972); 344 F. Supp.
387 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
26. See Sigelman, Spanhel and Lorenzen, Community Reactions to Community Deinstitutionalization:
Crime, Property Values and Other Bugbears, 45 J. REHABILITATION 52 (1979).
27. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Planning and Zoning Comm'n v. Synanon Founda-
tion, Inc., 153 Conn. 305, 216 A.2d 442 (1966). See also Comment, Exclusionary Zoning and Its Effects on
Group Homes in Areas Zonedfor Single Family Dwellings, 24 KAN. L. REV. 677 (1976); Comment, Exclusion of
the Mentally Handicapped: Housing the Non-Traditional Family, 7 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 150 (1974).
28. Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Oliver v. Zoning Comm'n, 31 Conn. Supp.
197, 326 A.2d 841 (C.P. 1974); Carroll v. City of Miami Beach, 198 So. 2d 643 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967); City of Des
Plaines v. Trottner, 34 Ill. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966); State ex rel. Ellis v. Liddle, 520 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1975); Kirsh Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241,281 A.2d 513 (1971); Gabe Collins Realty,
Inc. v. Margate City, 112 N.J. Super. 341,271 A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1970); Application ofLaPorte, 2 A.D.2d 710,
152 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1956); Group Home of Port Washington, Inc. v. Board of Zoning and Appeals, 82 Misc. 2d
753, 370 N.Y.S.2d 433 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (mem.); People v. Nolan, 78 Misc. 2d 607, 359 N.Y.S.2d 376 (App. Term
1973) (per curiam); (mem.); Nowack v. Department of Audit and Control, 72 Misc. 2d 518, 338 N.Y.S.2d 52
(Sup. Ct. 1973); Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette v. Village of Whitefish Bay, 267 Wis. 609, 66 N.W.2d
627 (1954).
29. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). See note 3 supra.
[Vol. 43:167
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING OF GROUP HOMES
II. Brownfield v. State
In Brownfield v. State,30 the state of Ohio purchased a single family
residence in Akron for use as a halfway house for patients discharged from the
Western Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation Center. The state leased the resi-
dence to Western Reserve Human Services, Inc., a nonprofit corporation,
which arranged for the care and supervision of the five residents of the facil-
ity. Zoning approval had not been sought prior to locating the rehabilitation
family home in the neighborhood. Adjacent property owners brought suit,
requesting a declaration that the use of the residence as a habilitation center
violated the zoning laws and seeking to enjoin further operation of the resi-
dence as such.3? '
The trial and appellate courts found in favor of the defendant.32 The Ohio
Supreme Court referred to the failure to apply for a conditional use permit for
the facility and suggested that procuring a permit not only would be possible
under the zoning laws, but would both satisfy the local zoning requirements
and promote the state's goal of operating the halfway house at the present
location. 3 The case was remanded for the lower court to consider whether the
state could obtain a conditional use permit. If the permit were to be obtained,
the case would be rendered moot?4
The central issue in Brownfield was "whether a privately-operated, state-
owned facility is automatically exempt from municipal zoning restrictions"
based on the theory of government immunity through an exercise of eminent
domain?5 The Ohio Supreme Court declared that the prior rule of law that
"zoning restrictions do not apply to state agencies vested with the power of
eminent domain" 36 was erroneously applied to the type of intergovernmental
conflict present in Brownfield, and proposed the adoption of a new resolution
of the conflict.
The court in Brownfield rejected the use of the governmental-proprietary
test to resolve intergovernmental conflicts, but it failed to define a sufficient
alternate standard? 7 Under the rejected test, the state's "governmental" ac-
tions would be immune from local zoning laws while "proprietary" actions of
30. 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 407 N.E.2d 1365 (1980).
31. Id. at 283, 407 N.E.2d at 1365.
32. Brownfield v. State of Ohio, No. CV77-12-2995 (C.P. Summit County, Ohio, July 10, 1978); Nos. C.A.
8991-8992 (C.A. Summit Co. May 2, 1979). The original defendants were the State of Ohio, the City of Akron,
the Akron Superintendent of Building Inspection and Regulation, and the Western Reserve Human Services,
Inc. The State of Ohio was dismissed as a party because it had not waived its immunity to suit, and the City of
Akron and the Superintendent of Building Inspection and Regulation were realigned by the trial court as parties
plaintiffs. 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 283, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1366 (1980).
33. 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 285, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1367 (1980).
34. Id. at 287, 407 N.E.2d at 1368.
35. Id. at 284, 407 N.E.2d at 1367.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 286, 407 N.E.2d at 1368. For an analysis and defense of the balancing test adopted in Brownfield,
see Case Comment, Government Immunity from Local Zoning Restrictions: The Balancing Test of Brownfield
v. State, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 229 (1982).
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the state would not be so protected. The distinction between governmental
and proprietary actions is perhaps a difficult one, but attempts have been
made to distinguish these functions on a mandatory or permissive basis.3 8 A
political unit is acting "governmentally" if its actions are pursuant to a legisla-
tive mandate to perform a duty. If the unit is granted a mere power to act but
is under no duty to do so, the act is proprietary and, under the rejected test,
subject to compliance with zoning restrictions. 9 These definitions, however,
fail to explain satisfactorily the distinction between public and private acts
that seems to form the basis of the test.4 One possible explanation of the basis
for the governmental-proprietary test is that the public purpose and social
utility of the state law are weighed against its interference with private inter-
ests protected by the conflicting local law.4! ' Under this analysis, the govern-
mental-proprietary test is, in essence, a balancing test. This test has been
criticized, however, for producing inconsistent and irrational decisions due to
the inherent difficulty of defining the two different types of governmental acts
with any precision. 2
The Ohio Supreme Court proposed that instead of the governmental-
proprietary test, a new balancing test be employed.!3 The court, in using this
new test, must first determine the "general public purposes to be served by
the exercise of each power" and then resolve the conflict in favor of the
power that serves the needs of the greatest number of citizens.4 The state
government will no longer be given absolute immunity from local laws.
Instead, use of the new Brownfield balancing test will result in a compromise
of state and local interests.
Upon first examination, the court's analysis is unobjectionable: "When-
ever possible, the divergent interests of governmental entities should be
harmonized rather than placed in opposition," and when "compliance with
zoning regulations would frustrate" 45 the state's purposes, a balance of inter-
ests may result in granting a qualified immunity to the state to resolve any
conflict."6 In both the governmental-proprietary test and the Brownfield bal-
ancing test, the court should examine the competing interests and, depending
upon the critical need, value, or reasonableness of either the state or local
law, decide whether the state is to be given a qualified immunity or whether
the local law will be granted supremacy over the state law.47 Since both tests
38. Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or Proprietary Test, 22 VA. L.
REV. 910 (1936).
39. Id. at 937.
40. Id. at 939.
41. Id. at 911.
42. Id. at 910.
43. 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 286, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (1980).
44. Id. at 285, 407 N.E.2d at 1368.
45. Id. at 286, 407 N.E.2d at 1368.
46. Id. at 287, 407 N.E.2d at 1368.
47. Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or Proprietary Test, 22 VA. L.
REV. 910 (1936).
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seek to strike a balance between competing governmental objectives, there is
a contradiction in the adoption of the Brownfield test and the court's summary
rejection of the governmental-proprietary test.4
The state delegates extensive zoning power to municipalities 4 9 By using
a balancing test, the courts have given to the political bodies most susceptible
to purely local pressures the power to defeat state-wide interests through
exclusionary laws. Unless a change is forthcoming from the courts or legisla-
tures, exclusionary zoning laws can force the clustering of habilitation facili-
ties in high density residential or commercial districts, defeating the intent of
the state program for locating habilitation homes in the family-type neighbor-
hoods most conducive to successful normalization.50
The Ohio Supreme Court in Brownfield declared that absolute immunity
from local zoning laws no longer will be granted to state government agencies
that take private property for public purposes under the power of eminent
domain. Brownfield has thus set the stage in Ohio for resolution of inter-
governmental conflicts: legitimate state policies may be overcome by local
political interests.
II. Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Association
The deletorious results of using Brownfield's new balancing test are par-
ticularly apparent in Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Association.5' The Siffrin
Residential Association is a nonprofit corporation organized under the pro-
visions of chapter 5123 of the Ohio Revised Code to provide for the operation
of a residential living facility for mentally retarded persons.52 The Siffrin
48. 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 286, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (1980).
49. OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3, which reads: "Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers
of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar
regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws."
50. See Boyd, Strategies in Zoning and Community Living Arrangements far Retarded Citizens: PARENS
PATRIAE Meets Police Power, 25 VILL. L. REV. 273 (1980).
51. 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 407 N.E.2d 1369 (1980).
52. 63 Ohio St. 2d 259,407 N.E.2d 1369 (1980). OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5123.19 (Page Supp. 1979), which
provides for the licensing of individuals to operate family or group home facilities, states:
(A) As used in this section and section 5123.19 of the Revised Code:
(1) 'Residential facility' means a home or facility in which a person with a developmental disability
resides, except a home subject to Chapter 3721 of the Revised Code or the home of a relative or legal
guardian in which a person with a developmental disability resides.
(3) "Family home' means a residential facility that provides room and board, personal care,
habilitation services, and supervision in a family setting for not more than eight persons with develop-
mental disabilities.
(B) Every person desiring to operate a residential facility shall apply for licensure of the facility to the
chief of the division of mental retardation and developmental disabilities.
(D) Any person may operate a licensed family home as a permitted use in any residential district or
zone, including any single-family residential district or zone, of any political subdivision. Family homes
may be required to comply with area, height, yard, and architectural compatibility requirements that
are uniformly imposed upon all single-family residences within the district or zone.
(E) Any person may operate a licensed group home as a permitted use in any multiple-family residential
district or zone of any political subdivision, except that a political subdivision that has enacted a zoning
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Association purchased a single family residence in Canton to be used as a
home for providing habilitation treatment for up to eight mentally retarded
adults. The home was located in a district zoned for one- and two-family
dwellings under the Canton city zoning ordinances. 3 Siffrin applied to the
Department of Mental Health for a license to operate the home. The Garcias
and other adjacent property owners opposed the application, claiming that the
facility would violate the Canton zoning restrictions and lower the value of
their property. The Department of Mental Health found that the Canton zon-
ing ordinance was superceded by Revised Code section 5123.18 (DP and
awarded the license to Siffrin. The Garcias instituted this action to enjoin
operation of the facility and to declare subsections (D) and (E) of section
5123.18 unconstitutional.
The trial court made the following findings: (1) the occupants of the
Siffrin facility did not satisfy the definition of "family" in chapter 1123 of the
Canton City Zoning Ordinances; (2) section 5123.18 (D) and (E) were not
"general laws" within the scope of the conflict provisions of article XVIII,
section 3, of the Ohio Constitution, but were "special laws," and as such
were prohibited by article II, section 26, of the Ohio Constitution; and (3)
section 5123.18 (D) and (E) were arbitrary and capricious, violating both
article I of the Ohio Constitution and the fourteenth amendment of the United
ordinance or resolution establishing planned unit development districts may exclude group homes from
such districts, and a political subdivision that has enacted a zoning ordinance or resolution may
regulate group homes in multiple-family residential districts or zones as a conditionally permitted use
or special exception, in either case, under reasonable and specific standards and conditions set out in
the zoning ordinance or resolution to: (1) Require the architectural design and site layout of the home
and the "location, nature, and height of any walls, screens, and fences to be compatible with adjoining
land uses and the residential character of the neighborhood; (2) Require compliance with yard, parking,
and sign regulations; (3) Limit excessive concentration of homes.
(G) Divisions (D) and (E) of this section are not applicable to municipal corporations that had in effect
on June 15, 1977, an ordinance specifically permitting in residential zones licensed residential facilities
by means of permitted uses, conditional uses, or special exception, so long as such ordinance remains
in effect without any substantive modifications.
53. 63 Ohio St. 2d 259,260,407 N.E.2d 1369 (1980). Canton City Code Chapter 1123 reads in part as follows:
"Dwelling Unit" means a group of rooms arranged, maintained or designed to be occupied by a
single-family (see definition of family), and consists of a complete bathroom, complete kitchen or
kitchenette; and facilities for living, sleeping and eating. All of the facilities are to be located in
contiguous rooms and used exclusively by such family and by any authorized persons occupying such
dwelling unit with the family.
... "Family" means one or more persons occupying a dwelling unit and living as a single house-
keeping unit, whether or not related to each other by birth or marriage, as distinguished from a group
occupying a boarding house, lodging house, motel, hotel, fraternity or sorority house.
54. 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 262, 407 N.E.2d 1369, 1372 (1980). See note 52 supra for the text of the statute.
Sixteen state legislatures, including Ohio, have passed laws that curtail the enactment of municipal zoning laws
designed to circumvent placement of group and family homes in single family residential districts. The decision
in Garcia has nullified the Ohio statute contained in chapter 5123 of the Revised Code, but the fifteen statutes
still in effect are: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-581 to -582 (West Supp. 1980); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§§ 5115-5116 (West 1972 & Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. SrAT. 88 27-10.5-133, 30-28-115 (1977 & Supp. 1980);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 59A, § 20C (1979); MICH. SrAT. ANN. § 5.2963(16a) (Supp. 1978); MNN. STAT. ANN.
§ 252.28, 462.357(7)-(8) (West Supp. 1981); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 11-2702.1 to .2 (Supp. 1977); NJ.
SrAT. ANN. § 30:4C-2(m)-26 (West 1981); N.M. SrAT. ANN. § 14-20-1 (Supp. 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 45-24-23 (Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-24-102-3 (1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4409(d) (Supp.
1981); VA. CODE § 15.1-486.2 (Supp. 1980); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 59.97(15) (West Supp. 1981).
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States Constitution.5 The Court of Appeals for Stark County reversed the
trial court on each finding,5 6 but was in turn reversed by the Ohio Supreme
Court.
7
The Ohio Supreme Court made a two-pronged inquiry into the issues
presented. First, as discussed below, it made a summary inquiry into the
meaning of "family" as expressed in the Canton zoning ordinance. This is the
weaker prong of the analysis. The second inquiry began by analyzing the
nature of the intergovermental conflict on lines similar to the governmental
interest "balancing" test adopted in Brownfield. This proved something of a
false start. The court then abandoned this line of analysis and instead attacked
the constitutionality of the statute itself. Thus, the second prong concerned
the distinction between the validity of general laws and special laws under the
state constitution.
5 9
A. Definition of Family
Defining the word "family" is important in determining whether a local
zoning ordinance for single family dwellings will be construed to avoid an
exclusionary result. The Ohio Supreme Court in Garcia did not, however,
interpret the Canton zoning ordinance as the plain meaning of the ordinance
would warrant, but rather inferred a requirement that a "family" must
demonstrate a "primary purpose" of sharing living facilities in order to qual-
ify as a family for purposes of the ordinance relating to a single family residen-
tial district.6 ' This interpretation narrowed the scope of the zoning ordinance
to include only certain types of families.
Unlike courts in other jurisdictions, the Ohio Supreme Court has not
presented a satisfactory analysis of "family." The definition of "family'6 2 as
requiring a "primary purpose" to share living facilities is a spontaneous and
unexplained standard asserted by the court.
55. Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Ass'n, 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 265-67, 407 N.E.2d 1369, 1374 (1980).
56. Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Ass'n, Nos. 4969, 4971, 4972 (Ct. App. Stark County, Ohio, March 7,
1979).
57. 63 OHIO Sr. 2d at 267, 407 N.E.2d at 1374.
58. See text accompanying notes 44-48 supra.
59. See discussion at text accompanying notes 80-82 infra.
60. See note 53 supra.
61. 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 268, 407 N.E.2d 1369, 1376 (1980).
62. It is important to note that the interpretation of "'family" in Garcia is not adversely affected by the
United States Supreme Court decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). The ordinance of
the Village of Belle Terre defined "family" as follows:
[o]ne or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking together as a single
housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants. A number of persons but not exceeding two (2)
living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not related by blood, adoption, or
marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family.
Id. at 2. The zoning ordinance in that case was much more restrictive than the Canton ordinance because it
specifically described the relationships between occupants that would support a finding of "family" occupancy.
The United States Supreme Court's analysis of the ordinance in Belle Terre is thus not analogous to the Garcia
case, nor does it justify the highly restrictive interpretation of the zoning ordinance in Garcia, although the Ohio
Supreme Court implied that the Belle Terre decision supported its reasoning. 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 274,407 N.E.2d
1369, 1379 (1980).
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A Florida case dealing with an issue analogous to that of Garcia is Carroll
v. City of Miami Beach.6 The zoning ordinance in that case defined "family"
as a single housekeeping unit, similar to the Canton zoning ordinance. The
city of Miami Beach, in denying an application by the Bishop of the Diocese
of Miami to use the property located in a single family residential district as a
home for a small group of novices to a religious order, said that the word
"family" was to be given the meaning commonly ascribed to it by the public
in general.6 This common meaning was the traditional biological family. The
trial court affirmed this reasoning, but the Florida Court of Appeals reversed&5
and held, "[T]he question before us is not what the word 'family' means in
common parlance, but what the City of Miami Beach zoning ordinance says it
means.' 66 The Court of Appeals declared that the words of the zoning ordi-
nance must be strictly construed, and absent an indication from the legislature
demanding a greater degree of consanguinity, none could be implied by the
courts. Although the Florida case is analogous to Garcia, the Ohio Supreme
Court has acted in the exact manner condemned by the Florida court. It has
required a nonstatutory "primary purpose" in dwelling together as a single
housekeeping unit: "We do not perceive this facility, and its statutorily
mandated purposes and duties, to be likened to what is reasonably thought of
to be a single housekeeping unit." 67 Rather than strictly construe the Canton
zoning ordinance in keeping with the plain meaning of its words, the court has
inferred restrictions where none exist on the statute's face. The Ohio
Supreme Court's freewheeling interpretation of the word "family" is an
example of judical interference with legislation. Such interference has not
been employed by courts in other jurisdictions faced with similar ordin-
ances.6
The Ohio Supreme Court stated that the residents of the Siffrin facility
would not, as their primary purpose, be dwelling together as a single house-
keeping unit.69 The court failed, however, to support this conclusion with any
evidence. No characteristic is described that distinguishes between the Siffrin
housekeeping unit and one that would satisfy the definition of family espoused
by the court. The court refused to admit that the only difference between the
Siffrin unit and an acceptable family unit under the zoning ordinance is that
63. 198 So. 2d 643 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967).
64. Id. at 644.
65. Id. at 645.
66. Id.
67. 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 268, 407 N.E.2d 1369, 1376 (1980).
68. Oliver v. Zoning Conm'n, 31 Conn. Supp. 197, 326 A.2d 841 (C.P. 1974); Little Neck Community
Ass'n v. Working Organization for Retarded Children, 52 A.D.2d 90, 383 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1976); Application of
LaPorte, 2 A.D.2d 710, 152 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1956); Incorporated Village of Freeport v. Ass'n For the Help of
Retarded Children, 94 Misc. 2d 1048,406 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1977); Missionaries of Our Lady ofLa Salette v. Village
of Whitefish Bay, 267 Wis. 609, 66 N.W.2d 627 (1954).
69. 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 268, 407 N.E.2d 1369, 1376 (1980): "[Ihe facts show that these clients of Siffrin
would not be residing in this dwelling unit as a single housekeeping unit in the same sense as would a group of
individuals who had joined together in these premises in order to primarily share the rooming, dining and other
facilities."
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the former consisted of mentally retarded persons, while the latter would
consist solely of persons of normal intelligence and abilities. The court could
urge only that the fundamental difference lay in the primary purpose of
occupying the premises 0 According to the court, the Siffrin facility had as its
"primary purpose" the tendering of habilitation training in life skills,71 which
is inherently different from merely sharing living facilities.
There is no support in the language of the statute for the court's interpre-
tation of Siffrin's primary purpose. 2 The statute instead indicates that provi-
sion of habilitation services was but one of many other purposes, and it could
not be read as requiring the essential purpose to be only habilitation. Indeed,
living, cooking, and pursuing other activities within the community is, in and
of itself, a training and learning experience for developmentally disabled per-
sons. But such a narrow analysis of the purposes of a family habilitation home
ignores the fact that the traditional "biological" family also uses and benefits
from community living to socialize and train children to develop necessary life
skills. It is plausible to argue that the primary purpose of even a typical family
could be the tendering of training in life skills. For these reasons, the court's
analysis of the meaning of "family" is eminently unsatisfactory.
B. Intergovernmental Conflict
Quite possibly the Ohio Supreme Court was aware of the weakness of its
definition of "family" and recognized the need for another basis for denying
the Siffrin Residential Association the status of a single housekeeping unit.
The second prong of the decision was designed to weigh the analysis in favor
of upholding the zoning ordinance over the state's attempt to locate habilita-
tion facilities in residential communities.
The court first classified the intergovernmental conflict presented in
Garcia. It conceded that the state law mandated the establishment of residen-
tial habilitation centers in the manner of a governmental, not proprietary,
function.73 In other words, the statute expressed the affirmative intent of the
Ohio legislature to promote and support deinstitutionalization by removing
barriers in the form of restrictive zoning laws that prevent the state, or private
citizens, or nonprofit corporations from operating facilities in communities
throughout the state. The court also found, in accord with well-established
70. Id.
71. Id. at 268, 407 N.E.2d at 1376: "[TMhe Siffrin facility would be established... primarily for the
purpose of bringing together a group of developmentally disabled persons for their training and education in life
skills ......
72. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5123.19(B)(3) (Page 1981), which reads: "'Family home' means a residential
facility that provides room and board, personal care, habilitation services, and supervision in a family set-
ting ....
73. 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 268, 407 N.E.2d 1369, 1376 (1980). The court admitted that each facility has
"statutorily mandated purposes and duties" under chapter 5123 to locate residential treatment facilities to
promote the deinstitutionalization of mentally retarded citizens.
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principles,74 that the municipal zoning ordinance was a proper exercise of the
police power granted to local government under article XVIII, section 3, of
the Ohio Constitution.75 Therefore, the conflict was between the state and
local government entities exercising "governmental-type" functions of the
police power to promote public health, safety, and general welfare.
The balancing test suggested in Brownfield requires the court to examine
the two competing interests and grant immunity to the interest that reasonably
effects the most good to the greatest number of citizens.76 The court in Garcia
began but did not pursue this line of analysis. 7 Indeed, under the Brownfield
test the court would have difficulty justifying a finding that sustained the
validity of a purely local zoning ordinance when confronted with the manifest
intent of the General Assembly78 to improve treatment facilities for develop-
mentally disabled persons state-wide. 79 Instead, the Ohio Supreme Court,
striking off on a new line of reasoning, focused its attention on the distinction
between general and special laws. This distinction is crucial because the
conflict provisions of article XVIII, section 3, of the Ohio Constitution re-
quire that local laws not conflict with general laws.80 Accordingly, the zoning
ordinance, a municipal law, would be overruled upon a finding that section
5123.18(D) and (E)8l regarding deinstitutionalization were conflicting
"general" laws. However, if sections (D) and (E) were found to be "special"
laws operating nonuniformly and arbitrarily, they would be void under article
I, section 26, of the Ohio Constitution,82 and the zoning ordinance would
retain its power to exclude the habilitation facility from the single-family
residential district.
The Ohio Supreme Court had held that when a municipality has been
granted the power to regulate for the public health, safety, morals, and gener-
al welfare and when a state has passed a general law of uniform application
throughout the state, the local law, if in conflict, is invalid.83 A local law that
74. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Village of Beachwood Iv. Board of
Elections, 167 Ohio St. 369, 148 N.E.2d 921 (1958); Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925); Village
of Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923); Leis v. Cleveland Railway Co., 101 Ohio St. 162,
128 N.E. 73 (1920); Froelich v. City of Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1919).
75. 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 270, 407 N.E.2d 1369, 1377 (1980).
76. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
77. 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 270, 407 N.E.2d 1369, 1377 (1980).
78. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5123.67 (Page Supp. 1979), which expresses the state's goal of deinstitu-
tionalization, quoted at note 99 infra.
79. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926), the Court stated, "It is not meant
by this, however, to exclude the possibility of cases where the general public interest would so far outweigh the
interest of the municipality that the municipality would not be allowed to stand in the way."
80. See note 49 supra.
81. See note 52 supra.
82. OHIO CONST. art. II, § 26 reads: "All laws, of a general nature, shall have a uniform operation
throughout the State; nor, shall any act, except such as relates to public schools, be passed, to take effect upon
the approval of any other authority than the General Assembly, except, as otherwise provided in this constitu-
tion." Special laws are laws that operate upon a nonuniform classification in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
See Miller v. Korns, 107 Ohio St. 287, 140 N.E. 773 (1923).
83. Schneiderman v. Sisanstein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N.E. 158 (1929); City ofBucyrus v. State Department
of Health, 120 Ohio St. 426, 166 N.E. 370 (1929).
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affects not only the municipality but also the territory around and beyond its
borders is outside the sphere of purely local concerns and must be controlled
by general state law.! It has likewise been held in other jurisdictions that a
local ordinance that thwarts state policy is void85 and that zoning ordinances
that fail to consider regional needs, in addition to purely local needs, are
void.m Chapter 5123 reveals that providing care and treatment for the state's
mentally ill and retarded citizens can be administered and accomplished only
on a state-wide scale. The Department of Mental Health is charged with
dividing the state into districts and providing for hospital or other care for
disabled citizens in those districts. Providing effective health care for its
disabled citizens must necessarily be done on a larger scale than that en-
compassed by local governments and therefore requires that state law on the
subject supercede local laws that prevent or inhibit its purposes.8 Therefore,
to uphold the validity of the Canton zoning ordinance over the Ohio deinstitu-
tionalization statute, and particularly over section 5123.18 (D) and (E),89 the
court had to find subsections (D) and (E) not to be general laws. In Village of
West Jefferson v. Robinson,90 the Ohio Supreme Court defined general laws
as statutes setting forth general police power regulations applied uniformly
throughout the state.9' Statutes that merely grant or limit the exercise of
police powers by municipalities are not general laws and not subject to the
conflict provisions of article XVIII, section 3, of the Ohio Constitution.92 The
court has stated that "[i]n determining whether an ordinance is in 'conflict'
with general laws, the test is whether the ordinance permits or licenses that
which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa." 93 It is under this test,
then, that the Canton zoning ordinance must be compared with Chapter 5123
of the Revised Code.
The court conceded in Garcia that "[iun the main, the provisions of R.C.
Chapter 5123 fall within the definition of a 'general law' providing a method
84. Village of Beachwood v. Board of Elections, 167 Ohio St. 369, 148 N.E.2d 921 (1958).
85. Abbott House v. Village of Tarrytown, 34 A.D.2d 821, 822, 312 N.Y.S.2d 841, 843 (1970) (mem.). The
court held, "[T]he Zoning Ordinance has the effect of totally thwarting the State's policy... of providing for
neglected children .... [lInsofar as it conflicts and hinders an overriding State law and policy favoring the care
of neglected and abandoned children, [it] is void as exceeding the authority vested in the Village of
Tarrytown .... "
86. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d
713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Duffcon Concrete Products v. Borough of
Cresskill, I N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super.
11, 283 A.2d 353 (1971); Molino v. Borough of Glassboro, 116 N.J. Super. 195, 281 A.2d 401 (1971).
87. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5123.12, 5123.15 (Page Supp. 1979).
88. See note 54 supra. The Department of Mental Health evidently understood that the provisions of
chapter 5123, and § 5123.18(D) in particular, superceded local law, since it ruled favorably on the application by
Siffrin Residential Ass'n for a license to operate its facility in Akron. In fact, it is likely that the State of Ohio in
Brownfield did not seek prior zoning approval because it assumed that chapter 5123 superceded local law. See
discussion in text accompanying notes 31-34 supra.
89. See note 52 supra.
90. 1 Ohio St. 2d 113, 205 N.E.2d 382 (1965).
91. Id. at 117, 205 N.E.2d at 384.
92. Id. at 118, 205 N.E.2d at 386. See also Leis v. Cleveland Railway Co., 101 Ohio St. 162, 128 N.E. 73
(1920).
93. Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 263, 140 N.E. 519, 519-20 (1923).
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by which the mentally retarded may hopefully be acclimated to a useful place
in society through the licensure of 'residential facilities' and the deinstitu-
tionalization of these mentally retarded individuals. '"94 The court did not,
however, extend the definition of a "general" law to section 5123.18 (D) and
(E), which the court found to be not reasonably related to the regulatory and
licensing portions of the Chapter.95 Instead, the court found subsections (D)
and (E) to be limitations upon the exercise of local police power, and, under
the holding of Village of West Jefferson, not "general" laws. The court stated
that, therefore, the conflict provisions of article XVIII, section 3, of the Ohio
Constitution could not be applied to resolve the intergovernmental conflict
presented in Garcia.
Separating subsections (D) and (E) from the other provisions of section
5123.18 and the other sections of the chapter violates the purpose and effect of
the chapter to improve the method of treatment and care for the state's
mentally retarded citizens. It is not likely that because of a denial of the ability
of the state to override restrictive local zoning ordinances, family or group
homes will be located in the residential districts determined to be the most
conducive to the habilitation of developmentally disabled persons.97 The dis-
sent by Justice Paul W. Brown in Garcia makes this result very clear by
noting that the majority's approach will handcuff the General Assembly so
that it may not create areas of statewide licensing that are exempt from local
municipal control.98 The general concerns of chapter 5123, as set out in sec-
tion 5123.67,99 indicate that to achieve the statutory purpose of deinstitu-
tionalization, it is necessary that section 5123.18 (D) and (E) be read as in-
tegral parts of the entire section and chapter. By failing to acknowledge these
specific subsections as central to the licensing goal of the statute, the majority
in Garcia ignored a line of prior decisions holding that in the context of
licensing the state alone may govern the carrying out of a particular use at a
94. 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 271, 407 N.E.2d 1369, 1378 (1980).
95. Id.
96. See note 49 supra.
97. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
98. 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 279, 407 N.E.2d 1369, 1383 (1980).
99. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5123.67 (Page Supp. 1979):
Chapter 5123 of the Revised Code shall be liberally interpreted to accomplish the following
purpose:
(A) To promote the human dignity and to protect the constitutional rights of mentally retarded
persons in the state;
(B) To encourage the development of the ability and potential of each mentally retarded person in
the state to the fullest possible extent, no matter how severe his degree of disability;
(C) To promote the economic security, standard of living, and meaningful employment of the
mentally retarded;
(D) To maximize the assimilation of mentally retarded persons into the ordinary life of the com-
munities in which they live;
(E) To recognize the need of mentally retarded persons, whenever care in a residential facility is
absolutely necessary, to live in surroundings; and circumstances as close to normal as possible.
Section 5123.67 thus indicates that for promotion of human dignity and development ofoportunities for retarded
individuals, assimilation into ordinary community life is essential to the purposes of the Chapter as a whole.
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specified location.' ° Thus when the state assumes responsibility for a certain
matter, it may safeguard that concern from municipal interference.
Furthermore, as the dissent in Garcia pointed out,'0 the court failed to
address the fact that subsections (D) and (E) of section 5123.18 were not
directed toward limiting the exercise of municipal police powers, but rather
were directed toward licensing individuals seeking to operate a family home in
a single-family residential district. Under the test of Village of West
Jefferson,12 then, since subsections (D) and (E) were not designed to limit
municipal laws, they did satisfy the test of a general law. Thus, the court's
analysis of the effect of subsections (D) and (E) is erroneous on two points:
first, the statute as a whole and subsections (D) and (E) in particular are
general laws due to both the statewide effect and the purpose of the legisla-
tion, and second, the statute does not limit municipal actions but rather assists
individuals who seek a license to operate a family or group home.
The court did not stop at concluding that subsections (D) and (E) of
section 5123.18 were not "general" laws. The court also found that those
subsections were void under the prohibition against "special laws" contained
in article II, section 26, of the Ohio Constitution.03 The basis for this finding
is that the provisions of (D) and (E) do not operate uniformly throughout the
state due to the provisions of subsection (G) of section 5123.18.1 4
Section 5123.18 (G) creates two classes of municipalities with respect to
the applicability of section 5123.18 (D) and (E). The provisions of subsections
(D) and (E) did not apply to municipalities that had voluntarily passed, prior
to June 15, 1977, zoning laws similar in purpose to section 5123.18 to allow
location of rehabilitation homes in single family residential districts. The court
found that subsection (G) rendered subsections (D) and (E) void for not opera-
ting uniformly upon every city in the state.'05 The court did not attempt to
provide any explanation for the conclusion that because of the operation of
subsection (G), subsections (D) and (E) were arbitrary and unrelated to the
purposes of the statute as a whole."°
Not only does this conclusion offend all sense of reason, but it is contrary
to the plain meaning of the statute itself and contrary to precedent laid down
in prior decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court. The mandate of chapter 5123 is
clearly expressed in section 5123.67:'07 the welfare of the mentally retarded
citizens throughout the state is to be promoted and improved by the establish-
100. Lorain v. Tomasic, 59 Ohio St. 2d 1, 391 N.E.2d 726 (1979); Auxter v. Toledo, 173 Ohio St. 444, 183
N.E.2d 920 (1962); State ex rel. McElroy v. Akron, 173 Ohio St. 189, 181 N.E.2d 26 (1962); Neil House Hotel
Co. v. Columbus, 144 Ohio St. 248, 58 N.E.2d 665 (1944).
101. 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 278, 407 N.E.2d 1369, 1382 (1980).
102. See text accompanying notes 90-93 supra.
103. See note 82 supra.
104. See note 52 supra.
105. 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 273, 407 N.E.2d 1369, 1379 (1980).
106. Id. at 273, 407 N.E.2d at 1379.
107. See text accompanying note 99 supra.
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ment of family habilitation facilities regardless of the restrictions in local
zoning ordinances.
There would be no purpose served in employing the provisions of subsec-
tions (D) and (E) to allow for the location of family home facilities in single
family residential districts where the city ordinances currently in effect pro-
vided for their operation through permitted or conditional uses or special
exceptions. There is nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in exempting from the
state mandate those cities already providing for deinstitutionalization.
Furthermore, the discretion to enact legislation subject to local options is
part of the power of the General Assembly, and a local option provision does
not violate the requirements of article H, section 26, of the Ohio Constitution
that all laws operate in a uniform manner throughout the state. °38 The pres-
ence of a provision exempting some municipalities from the effect of a state
law is not, as a matter of law, unconstitutional: "Section 26, Art. II of the
Constitution, was not intended to render invalid every law which does not
operate upon all ... political subdivisions within the state ... [The law is
equally valid if it contains provisions which permit it to operate upon every
locality where certain specified conditions prevail."' 9
The Ohio Supreme Court has patently ignored the plain meaning of the
statute and forestalled the intent of the General Assembly both in interpreta-
tion of "family" in the zoning ordinance and in the interpretation of
"general" and "special" laws applied to subsections (D) and (E) of section
5123.18. The court has manifested a willingness to subvert the intent of the
General Assembly and to reverse or disregard precedent of Ohio law and law
of other jurisdictions to uphold the supremacy of local zoning laws over state
legislation. This willingness belies the court's sincerity in its expressions of
sympathy with the purposes of the state statute."' The court prefaced its
opinion with an apology:
We hasten to add at the outset of our discussion of the legal issues presented here
that we are fully in sympathy with, and support of, the purposes of R.C. Chapter
5123.... It may not be reasonably questioned that there is considerable merit in a
law which seeks to maximize the assimilation of mentally retarded persons into the
ordinary life of the community in which they live, and to provide places for them
to live in surroundings and circumstances as close to normal as possible."'
In spite of the court's ostensible deference to the spirit of the law, it is
unwilling to enforce the letter of the law.
Garcia's holding that subsections (D) and (E) were unconstitutional has
crippled the effectiveness of chapter 5123 and has rendered the promise of
deinstitutionalization a lame one. It is clear that advocates of mental health
and legal reform will be met with a less than friendly reception by the
Supreme Court of Ohio.
108. City of Canton v. Whitman, 44 Ohio St. 2d 62, 337 N.E.2d 766 (1975).
109. State ex rel. Stanton v. Powell, 109 Ohio St. 383, 385, 142 N.E. 401, 401 (1924).
110. 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 267, 407 N.E.2d 1369, 1375 (1980).
111. Id.
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IV. Carroll v. Washington Township
In the third of the series of cases dealing with exclusionary zoning, the
Ohio Supreme Court continued its trend and upheld the exclusion of yet
another socially and politically disadvantaged group: foster children.
The Carroll family had been licensed to care for foster children from the
Richland County Children Services for several years prior to their purchase of
a home in Washington Township, in a district zoned both single-family res-
idential and agricultural. The Carrolls were notified that their use of the
premises to accommodate foster children constituted a violation of the local
zoning laws, and after their application for a variance or a rezoning was
denied, the Carrolls instituted suit. They sought to have their use of the
property declared to be in compliance with the zoning ordinance or, alterna-
tively, to have the zoning ordinance as applied to their situation declared
confiscatory and in violation of due process. Affirming the lower courts, the
Ohio Supreme Court found against the Carrolls."'
In the Carroll case the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the interpretation
of "family" as it affects the application of a zoning ordinance limiting uses to
single-family residences."' To interpret this ordinance, the court accepted a
new doctrine, devised by the Court of Appeals for Richland County," 4 that
enables the ordinance to be interpreted to achieve a highly restrictive result.
Townships have been granted the power to adopt comprehensive zoning
resolutions by the General Assembly under chapter 519 of the Revised
Code." 5 Washington Township adopted a zoning resolution providing for
various classifications of uses. The Carrolls' home was located in an "R-I"
residential district, which permitted only single-family residential dwelling
units." 6 The resolution contained no accompanying definition of any of the
terms in the ordinance. The court declared that in the absence of legislative
definition of the word "family," its meaning must be determined from the
interpretation of the intended zoning objectives." 7 Relying on the United
States Supreme Court's approval in Belle Terre"8 of zoning objectives to
provide quiet sanctuaries for families, the court found that the provision of
fire and police protection, decrease of noise and regulation of traffic, and the
protection of a stable residential neighborhood are reasonable zoning objec-
tives. 1 9 The court, however, did not take the logical step that followed and
discuss whether the presence in the neighborhood of a foster home providing
living facilities for up to seven foster children who remain in the home from
six months to one year or more will negatively affect any of these objec-
112. Carroll v. Washington Township Zoning Conmm'n, 63 Ohio St. 2d249, 250, 408 N.E.2d 191,192(1980).
113. Id. at 251, 408 N.E.2d at 192.
114. No. 1698, (Ct. App. Richiand County, Ohio, May 10, 1979).
115. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 519.01-.99 (Page 1953).
116. 63 Ohio St. 2d 249, 250, 408 N.E.2d 191, 192 (1980).
117. Id. at 252, 408 N.E.2d at 193.
118. 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
119. 63 Ohio St. 2d 249, 252, 408 N.E.2d 191, 193 (1980).
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tives. 2° The court failed to explain how the presence of foster children
destroyed the stability of the neighborhood or made noise and disturbance
sufficient to inconvenience other families.
Instead, without any support from prior cases or guidance from case law
in other jurisdictions, the court adopted the reasoning of the appellate court
and found that this particular foster home failed to qualify as a single-family
home because the foster children were not sufficiently "integrated" so as to
constitute one family.12 ' The court did not offer any criteria by which a satis-
factory degree of "integration" can be determined. The court simply stated
that "[a]lthough the line may seem infinitesimally narrow as to what may be
considered a single family unit, we hold ... that the Carrolls and the foster
children were not functioning as a single family unit.. . ."22 The court
emphasized two facts concerning the operation of the foster home that de-
stroyed the family character sought to be protected by the zoning ordinance.
These were, first, that the Carrolls must accept each child under the terms of a
contract with the state regarding their placement and, second, that the
Carrolls promulgated house rules concerning chores, school attendance, and
curfews for the foster children, as well as their own children.'23 For these two
reasons, the Ohio Supreme Court found the character of the Carrolls' foster
home inimical to that of traditional "biological" family life.
In making this decision the Carroll court produced a decision offensive
to the public's moral sensibilities as evidenced by state legislation designed to
provide foster care for juvenile wards of the state.' 24 While the decision in
Carroll is exceptiopally vulnerable to attack on moral grounds, there are
equally egregious and potent flaws in the decision's legal reasoning. First,
citing to only two United States Supreme Court decisions25 for elementary
rules of law that have no particular bearing upon the issue presented in
Carroll, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed a decision based on unsupported
conclusionary statements of law.
Second, the court failed to follow the rule of strict statutory construction
in interpreting the meaning of a zoning resolution that imposes restrictions
upon the use of private property. 26 The language of the zoning resolution
makes no requirement of "integration" in order to qualify as a family, nor is
there any rational basis for including "integration" in the definition of
"family.' 1 27
120. Id. at 258, 408 N.E.2d at 197 (P. Brown, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 252, 408 N.E.2d at 193.
122. Id.
123. Transcript of Oral Argument at 59, Carroll v. Washington Township Zoning Comm'n, 63 Ohio St. 2d
249, 408 N.E.2d 191 (1980).
124. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5153.01-.53 (Page 1953).
125. 63 Ohio St. 2d 249, 251-52, 408 N.E.2d 191, 192-93 (1980) (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388, 395 (1926)). The other case relied upon is Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9
(1974), which does not present an ordinance analogous to the zoning ordinance interpreted in the Carroll
decision and is of little value in reaching the decision in that case.
126. State ex rel. Ice & Fuel Co. v. Kreizweiser, 120 Ohio St. 352, 166 N.E. 228 (1929).
127. See text accompanying notes 67-71 supra concerning the interpretation of the statute according to its
plain meaning rather than as connoting a quality of family life not clearly expressed in the statutory language.
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Third, the facts of the Carroll's family life demonstrate that in sharing
family outings, meals, and vacations with their own and their foster children,
their family was in every respect of the word, "integrated.' 28 The emphasis
placed on the lack of permanency in the foster relationship would mean that
no foster family arrangement could satisfy the zoning requirements because it
would always be possible to declare that the transiency of the care was the
sole measure of the nature of the care. The very essence of foster family care
is impermanence. 129 Other jurisdictions have addressed the question of the
nature of foster homes and have concluded that while the residents are not
permanently living in the foster home, there is no loss of the sense of family in
the quality of the relationship established:
Any foster care program,... is in a very real way "temporary," since foster care
by its very nature is simply a method for caring for children until they can either be
returned to their natural parents or until an adoptive home can be found for
them.... Petitioner's very purpose is to create a stable, family type environment
for children whose natural families unfortunately cannot provide such a
home.... The surrogate family which petitioner hopes to create is in fact a per-
manent family structure, and not a temporary residence for transients .... [T]he
family unit itself will continue. 130
The Ohio Supreme Court in Carroll has approved the application of
exclusionary zoning laws for much more than the regulation of land use; the
court has approved the use of zoning laws to intrude into the internal com-
position of the family unit itself.'13 Cases in other jurisdictions have found that
family living is not dependent upon the biological or legal relationship of the
residents, but rather the use and occupancy of the residence as a single
housekeeping unit. 132 The California case of Brady v. Superior Court133 stated,
"'Single family dwelling' designates the joint occupancy and use of the dwell-
ing by all of those who live there. The word 'single' precludes the segregation
of certain portions or rooms for rental. . . . 'Family' signifies living as a
family, it inhibits the breaking up of the premises into segregated units." The
generic character of the family is the quality sought to be maintained by the
zoning ordinance or resolution, not the biological relationships.
134
As Justice Paul W. Brown's dissent points out in Carroll, the public
policy weighs in favor of the placement of foster children into residential
neighborhoods.135 The General Assembly, in passing chapter 5153 for the
128. Transcript of Oral Argument at 36-50, Carroll v. Washington Township Zoning Comm'n, 63 Ohio St.
2d 249, 408 N.E.2d 191 (1980).
129. 63 Ohio St. 2d 249, 254, 408 N.E.2d 191, 195 (1980) (P. Brown, J., dissenting).
130. Group House of Port Washington Inc. v. Board of Zoning, 45 N.Y.2d 266, 273, 380 N.E.2d 207,
210-11, 408 N.Y.S.2d 377, 380-81 (1978).
131. 63 Ohio St. 2d 249, 256, 408 N.E.2d 191, 195 (1980) (P. Brown, J., dissenting). See also White Plains v.
Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974), which found that a zoning restriction based
on a definition of "family" similar to the ordinance in Belle Terre, see note 59 supra, was invalid because it did
not regulate land use, but rather interfered with intimate family relationships.
132. See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
133. 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 77, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242, 247 (1962).
134. See note 28 supra.
135. 63 Ohio St. 2d 249, 258, 408 N.E.2d 191, 196-97 (1980) (P. Brown, J., dissenting).
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licensing of foster homes, has set out an underlying purpose to establish
homes where foster children can receive care and nurture in an environment
as similar to that of a traditional "biological" family as is feasible. According-
ly, the result reached in Carroll is both morally and legally reprehensible.
Fortunately, the effect of Carroll was short-lived in Ohio. The "integra-
tion" doctrine, which could have proved a formidable barrier to the estab-
lishment of foster homes in single family residential districts, was not drawn
upon by the Ohio Supreme Court to resolve a subsequent zoning dispute 36
with respect to a foster child facility. The fact that the Ohio Supreme Court
agreed to hear a case almost identical to Carroll a brief nine months after that
decision indicates that the court itself had qualms about the future application
of the "integration doctrine."
V. Sanders v. Clark County Zoning Department
In Saunders v. Clark County Zoning Department137 the Ohio Supreme
Court was faced with another confrontation between local zoning authorities
who urged a narrow interpretation of the word "family" in a zoning ordinance
and private individuals who sought to operate a foster child care facility in a
single-family residential district.
The issue in Saunders was whether a foster care facility for delinquent
boys was a "family" in compliance with the requirements imposed by the
zoning resolution for an R-1 suburban residence district in Enon, Ohio.
Reverend William Saunders and his wife operated a group home, Horizon
House, in a large house in Enon, Ohio, and provided foster care for as many
as nine delinquent youths, as well as their own five children. 38 Local zoning
officials claimed that Reverend Saunders was operating a "boarding house"
in violation of the zoning resolution that designated that the neighborhood be
made up exclusively of single-family detached dwellings.
139
After receiving a notice to cease the operation of the home, plaintiffs
Saunders filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in order to
continue operating Horizon House. The trial court found Horizon House to
be a boarding house and rendered judgment in favor of the Clark County
Zoning Department.' 40 On appeal, the Clark County Court of Appeals re-
136. Saunders v. Clark County Zoning Dep't, 66 Ohio St. 2d 259, 421 N.E.2d 152 (1981).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. The relevant definitional portions of the Clark County zoning resolution are as follows:
4.08: Boarding or Lodging House. A building or part thereof, other than a hotel or restaurant,
where meals and/or lodging are provided, for compensation, for five (5) or more persons not transients.
4.171: Dwelling, Single Family. A building designed for or used exclusively by one family or
housekeeping units.
4.18: Family. A person living alone, or two or more persons living together as a single housekeep-
ing unit, in a dwelling unit, as distinguished from a group occupying a boarding house, lodging house,
motel or hotel, fraternity or sorority house.
140. 66 Ohio St. 2d 259, 260, 421 N.E.2d 152, 154 (1981).
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versed the lower court and held that a foster child and his foster parents
constituted a "family" and that no violation of the zoning resolution had
occurred. 4'
The majority opinion delivered by Justice Clifford Brown affirmed the
decision of the Court of Appeals, but, disappointingly, failed to base that
affirmance on more than the barest of legal precedent. Therefore, the implicit
rejection of the "integration" doctrine of Carroll and the "primary purpose"
doctrine of Garcia is not sufficiently buttressed by case law authority. Rather,
the rejection of those exclusionary doctrines appears to be more of an
emotional decision than a conclusion following inevitably from sound legal
principles. Consequently, the decision in Saunders has less value as a weapon
to defeat other exclusionary zoning schemes and is limited to its facts.
Relying upon only one basic tenet of property law, the court stated that
zoning resolutions, being in derogation of the common law by depriving a
property owner of certain uses, must be narrowly construed. 142 The court
stated that the trial court failed to heed this principle in upholding the zoning
officials' characterization of the foster home as a "boarding house.
g14 3
Without further analysis of how the zoning department had failed to
construe narrowly the zoning resolution defining "family" with respect to the
foster home, the court turned to the constitutional ramifications of a narrow
definition of "family." The court stated, with only cursory recognition of
several United States Supreme Court decisions on the rights of privacy with
respect to marriage and family life, that "any resolution seeking to define this
term narrowly would unconstitutionally intrude upon an individual's right to
choose the family living arrangement best suited to him and his loved
ones.... A state or local government cannot constitutionally invade the
private realm of family life."' 144
While the facts of Saunders most clearly parallel those in the Carroll
case, 45 the Ohio Supreme Court did not resort to the "integration" test of
Carroll'46 to determine whether the foster parent and child relationship con-
formed with the notion of the traditional biological family. Relying on a basic
principle of property law and the constitutionally guaranteed right of privacy
the court repudiated the restrictive definition of "family" established in both
141. Id.
142. Id. at 261,421 N.E.2d at 154. The court cited several decisions setting forth the basic proposition that
legislation passed in derogation of common law principles must be construed narrowly. See In re University
Circle, Inc., 56 Ohio St. 2d 180, 383 N.E.2d 139 (1978); State ex rel. Ice & Fuel Co. v. Kreuzweiser, 120 Ohio St.
352, 166 N.E. 228 (1929).
143. 66 Ohio St. 2d 259, 261, 421 N.E.2d 152, 154 (1981).
144. Id. at 263, 421 N.E.2d at 155. The opinion refers to the decision in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494 (1977), which concerned an attempt by zoning authorities to prevent an elderly woman from living in a single
family residential district while making a home for her two grandchildren, who were cousins. The zoning
officials unsuccessfully argued that this family living arrangement was not sufficiently close by blood ties to
constitute a "'family" within the meaning of the zoning ordinance. Also cited was Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944), which concerned the right to privacy in marriage for choosing methods of family planning.
145. See text accompanying note 112 supra.
146. See text accompanying note 122 supra.
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previous cases. Curiously, the majority decision makes no reference to those
precedents in holding: "The definition of 'family' in this resolution is a
broad one .... A family unit, which performs the social function of childrear-
ing, regardless of its relationship or composition or whether it includes foster
children as well as natural children, is constitutionally protected against
government intrusion not supported by a compelling governmental
interest." 47 While the court could have expanded this analysis to embrace the
concept of a family of retarded persons receiving supervisory and rehabilita-
tive care, or even further, to include any group, regardless of composition,
whose function is to operate as a single unit, it failed to do so. What could
have been a sweeping condemnation of all restrictive zoning schemes de-
signed to exclude nontraditional family living arrangements instead is dimin-
ished to produce a very narrow holding that "a family based group foster
home for delinquent boys, who are unrelated by affinity or consanguinity to
the foster parents, is a permitted use in an 'R-1 suburban residence district'
where the zoning resolution defines the term 'family' as 'two or more
persons living together as a single family housekeeping unit .... ""48
The decision in Saunders had no effect upon Brownfield's new balancing
test. Saunders, however, has affected the law of the Carroll decision. Because
both Saunders and Carroll concern foster care facilities and because
Saunders squarely asserts that a foster care family approximates the social
function of child rearing performed by a biological family, 49 the Saunders
case implicitly overrules Carroll.
Similarly, although to a more limited extent, Saunders has affected the
primary purpose definition of family in Garcia. The decision in Garcia, is,
however, distinguishable from Saunders because it concerns the state's
efforts to establish group homes for the mentally retarded, rather than efforts
by individuals receiving state funds to provide foster child care. For even
more important reasons, though, Garcia still poses a problem for those antag-
onistic to exclusionary zoning. Subsections (D) and (E) of section 5123.18 are
still declared unconstitutional, and chapter 5123 is still without legal authoriy
to effectuate the goals of habilitation. 5'
Presented with an opportunity to expressly overrrule the narrow inter-
pretations of "family" endorsed in Garcia and Carroll, the court in Saunders
rendered a decision that can easily be circumvented by presenting any
material variation from the factual pattern of Saunders or by inserting specif-
ic, restrictive language in the zoning resolution, held constitutional in Belle
Terre. 151
The Saunders decision has limited value as precedent in eliminating ex-
clusionary zoning schemes. While it is arguable that the Carroll "integration"
147. 66 Ohio St. 2d 259, 263, 421 N.E.2d 152, 155-56 (1981).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See text accompanying note 122 supra.
151. See text accompanying notes 61-70 supra.
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testI52 is overruled by implication in Saunders, the "primary purpose" test of
Garcia,'53 which is directed toward habilitation homes, is possibly unaffected.
The gratuitous reference in Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion that Garcia
was overruled is acknowledged in neither the syllabus nor the majority
opinion.154
Saunders is but one candle dispelling the shadow of exclusionary zoning.
The spectre envisioned by the zoning authorities of Clark County that bar-
racks-like facilities housing eighty or more delinquent youths would prolifer-
ate and turn nice family neighborhoods into slums has been revealed, in light
of Saunders, to be nothing more than an alarmist absurdity. 55 However, the
court did not render a decision easily applied beyond the narrow facts and
circumstances of the case, and the promise of homes for the retarded, the
handicapped, or the mentally ill remains shrouded in the prejudice latent in
exclusionary zoning schemes.
VI. STRATEGIES TO Avom RESTRICTIVE ZONING
The trend toward exclusionary and restrictive zoning in Ohio as a result
of the cases discussed herein is not in accord with the general trend of the law
in other jurisdictions, most notably New York and New Jersey. 56 Scholarly
writing is also replete with strategies designed to circumvent the harsh results
that exclusionary zoning imposes on homes for the mentally ill or retarded,
foster children, and others. 5
7
A. Constitutional Attacks
Local zoning laws excluding foster children, mentally ill, or the mentally
retarded are subject to an equal protection attack. Classifying the retarded
or mentally ill on the basis of an immutable characteristic present at birth
appears to treat these people as a separate class of citizens. The need to
protect the politically impotent from a stigma of inferiority may demand that
laws affecting this "discrete and insular minority" receive strict scrutiny58 by
the court. Even if the claim of suspect classification fails, the interference
152. 66 Ohio St. 2d 259, 265, 421 N.E.2d 152, 156 (1981).
153. See text accompanying notes 105-11 supra.
154. 66 Ohio St. 2d 259, 263, 421 N.E.2d 152, 155 (1981).
155. Id.
156. See note 28 supra for citation to cases evidencing this general trend to defeat exclusionary zoning
laws.
157. Boyd, Strategies in Zoning and Community Living Arrangements for Retarded Citizens: PARENS
PATRIAE Meets Police Power, 25 VILL. L. REV. 273 (1980); Friedman, Analysis of the Principal Issues and
Strategies in Zoning Exclusion Cases, in 2 LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 1093 (10/3);
Lippincott, "A Sanctuary for People": Strategies for Overcoming Zoning Restrictions on Community Homes
for Retarded Persons, 31 SrAN. L. REV. 767 (1979); Mason and Menaloscino, The Right to Treatment for the
Mentally Retarded: An Evolving Legal and Scientific Interface, 10 U. CREIGHTON L. REV. 124 (1976);
Rubinowitz, Exclusionary Zoning: A Wrong In Search of a Remedy, 6 J.L. REF. 625 (1973); Comment,
Exclusion of the Mentally Handicapped: Housing the Non-Traditional Family, 7 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 150
(1974).
158. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). See also note 18 supra concerning
"strict scrutiny."
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with fundamental rights may warrant strict scrutiny of laws diminishing the
exercise of those rights.'59
The Supreme Court in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas'60 gave examples
of instances that would represent possible interference by zoning laws with
equal protection or due process. The first would occur if persons were ex-
cluded on the basis of race.' 6 ' The second would arise as a result of an
ordinance requiring two-thirds consent of other property owners before
allowing the operation of a home for the elderly or for children: "A proposed
home for the aged poor was not shown by its maintenance and construction
'to work any injury, inconvenience, or annoyance to the community, the
district or any person."" 62
While the Supreme Court's approval of an exclusionary zoning ordinance
in Belle Terre seemed at first to have dealt a fatal blow to many avenues of
attack on the constitutionality of restrictively worded zoning ordinances, the
facts'63 allow for some distinctions that limit its applicability. First, the lan-
guage of the Belle Terre ordinance was highly restrictive and qualified its
definition of "family" to those members related by blood, marriage, or adop-
tion. 64 Second, the stability and permanence of a unit comprised of college
students, a central issue in Belle Terre, is less obvious than the stability of the
type of unit contemplated in family homes for the retarded or foster
children.' 65 Finally, the Court was able to demonstrate a relationship between
the goals of the zoning ordinance to promote a quiet, stable neighborhood and
limitation of occupancy to traditional family residents.
In the three Ohio cases considered, Brownfield, Garcia, and Carroll,
none of these distinguishing features exists to warrant comparison with the
decision reached in Belle Terre to exclude foster homes or group homes.
Restrictive zoning laws may still be challenged in light of other court cases:
The Belle Terre decision has not foreclosed the question of the validity of
restrictive zoning laws.' 66 For example, in White Plains v. Ferraioli,67 the
159. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 384 (1978).
160. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). See note 3 supra.
161. 416 U.S. 1, 6 (1974).
162. Id. at 6-7 (citing Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928)).
163. In Belle Terre a group of college students had taken up residence together in a house located in the
village of Belle Terre on Long Island, New York. The owners of the house received a notice to remedy the
violation of a local zoning ordinance that prohibited occupation of any house in the area by other than a family.
Family was narrowly defined to mean persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage. The owners and tenants
sought injunctive relief and a declaration that the ordinance was unconstitutional under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
District Court held the ordinance constitutional, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Id. at 3. The
Supreme Court of the United States found no violation of any constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights
such as freedom of travel, association, or privacy. Id. By giving undue deference to the exercise of legislative
discretion to protect the sanctity of a family neighborhood, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
exclusionary zoning ordinance.
164. See note 62 supra.
165. City of Des Planes v. Trottner, 34 I11. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966).
166. Mason and Menaloscino, The Right to Treatment for Mentally Retarded Citizens: An Evolving Legal
and Scientific Interface, 10 U. CREIGHTON L. REV. 124 (1976).
167. 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974).
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New York Court of Appeals struck down an ordinance that defined the family
as those people related by blood, marriage, or adoption68 because valid
zoning laws regulate the use and development of land, but are not permitted to
regulate intimate family relationships. The court in White Plains distinguished
Belle Terre on the basis that the group home in White Plains was a permanent,
not temporary, living arrangement. 69 Furthermore, there is an argument that
establishing group homes enhanced the achievement of the very family values
sought to be protected under the zoning ordinance. 7 '
In addition to arguments founded upon equal protection, interference
with certain fundamental rights, such as privacy, marriage, or freedom of
travel have been suggested as potential grounds for attacking zoning laws. 17'
The Ohio Supreme Court in Saunders hinted that the basis for its decision was
the constitutional protection extended to the "privacy of family life,'1 72 a
hybrid right combining the fundamental rights of privacy and marriage, one
that may serve as a basis for a constitutional challenge to exclusionary zoning.
B. Eminent Domain
Another approach to evade the effect of restrictive zoning laws was used
in Boyd v. Gateways to Better Living, Inc.,' 73 a 1975 Ohio Common Pleas
case. In that case, the court held that the state, through the exercise of its
power of eminent domain, can acquire private land for a public use. When this
is done, local zoning ordinances do not apply to the property held by the state.
In Brownfield, however, this method of evading local zoning laws was ren-
dered ineffective.'74 The "balancing test" is less likely to insure the fulfill-
ment of the state's goals rather than local government's interests,' 75 unless it
can be demonstrated that the zoning ordinance totally thwarts state policy.
76
168. See note 62 supra for the ordinance of the Village of Belle Terre, which employed a highly restrictive
definition of "family."
169. 34 N.Y.2d 300, 303-04, 313 N.E.2d 756, 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449, 452 (1974).
170. These arguments have been successfully used to evade the holding of Belle Terre in City of Des Plaines
v. Trottner, 34 Ill. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966); State ex rel. Ellis v. Liddle, 520 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. Ct. App.
1975); Group Home of Port Washington, Inc. v. Board of Zoning and Appeals, 370 N.Y.S.2d 433 (Sup. Ct. 1975)
(mem.).
171. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974).
172. 66 Ohio St. 2d 259, 263, 20 Ohio Op. 3d 244, 247, 421 N.E.2d 152, 155 (1981). The court supported its
argument that family life is a fundamental right guaranteed protection by the United States Constitution by citing
two United States Supreme Court decisions: Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944).
173. No. 73C1531 (C.P. Mahoning County, Ohio, filed April 18, 1973).
174. See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
175. Id. See also City of Temple Terrace v. Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc., 322 So. 2d 571
(Fla. Ct. App. 1975).
176. State ex rel. Ellis v. Liddle, 520 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Abbott House v. Village of
Tarrytown, 34 A.D.2d 821, 312 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1970) (mem.); Nowack v. Department of Audit and Control, 338
N.Y.S.2d 52 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Yorkavitz v. Board of Township Trustees, 166 Ohio St. 349, 142 N.E.2d 655
(1957).
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C. State Supremacy - Legislative Attack
The final method of attack upon restrictive zoning laws is a legislative
one.'7 New Jersey has passed a statute invalidating any zoning ordinance that
discriminates between biological children and children placed under a foster
care arrangement.' 78 Chapter 5123 of the Ohio Revised Code had attempted to
achieve roughly the same result for mentally retarded and mentally ill persons
by allowing the location of habilitation homes in single family residential
districts regardless of exclusionary provisions in local zoning codes.' 79 While
Garcia has nullified the effectiveness of chapter 5123, the legislature may still
overcome the infirmity of unconstitutionality by removing subsection (G) of
section 5123.18180 and thereby allowing subsections (D) and (E) to operate
uniformly across the state. In addition, by restating the intent that the law is to
be a general law, the conflict provisions of article XVIII, section 3, of the
Ohio Constitution could operate to resolve the conflict between the state and
the municipality in a manner favorable to the state.'
8
'
VII. CONCLUSION
It is clear that the legal community cannot let the progress of the last
several decades in mental health and social reform collapse or stagnate merely
because legal sophistry has defeated deinstitutionalization in Ohio. Habilita-
tion treatment is recognized as the most humane and effective, and the least
costly, method of serving the needs of the mentally ill and retarded,' s2 as well
as socially disadvantaged persons such as foster children, alcoholics, and
drug abusers.
In Brownfield, Garcia, and Carroll, the Ohio Supreme Court established
an effective continuum of policy and law that supports exclusionary zoning
and makes it relatively invulnerable to attack. The seemingly new direction
given to the "balancing test" for intergovernmental conflicts in Brownfield
allows the possibility of upholding local interests over those of the state. The
Ohio Supreme Court has laid the groundwork for local frustration of statewide
statutory schemes designed for the welfare of minority citizens. The newly
created "integration doctrine" of Carroll imposed a standard of family life
impossible to achieve by all but traditional biological families, while intruding
into the private internal functioning of the family itself. While Saunders has
177. Prior attempts to have municipalities reform zoning laws met with little success in Ohio. See R.
HOPPERTON, ZONING FOR COMMUNITY HOMES: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE HANDBOOK FOR MUNICIPAL
OFFICIALS (1975). Only five municipalities in Ohio made voluntary reforms in their zoning laws to allow
rehabilitative family and group homes to operate in single family residential districts. R. HOPPERTON, ZONING
FOR COMMUNITY HOMES: HANDBOOK FOR LOCAL LEGISLATIVE CHANGE 60 (1975).
178. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-33.2 (Supp. 1975-76).
179. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5123.18 (D) & (E) (Page Supp. 1979). See also note 48 supra for other
statutory schemes similar to the scheme intended in the Ohio Revised Code.
180. See note 52 supra.
181. See text accompanying notes 81-82 supra.
182. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
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impliedly ended the brief, but nevertheless invidious, life of the "integration
doctrine" espoused in Carroll, it does not necessarily correct the equally
noxious "primary purpose" doctrine developed in Garcia. The private inter-
nal functioning of the nontraditional family, such as family living in an habil-
itative group home, can still expect little protection from courts in future
zoning conflicts. And it is in Garcia that the results anticipated in the cases of
Brownfield and Carroll realize the full negative potential to exclude habilita-
tion homes from single family residential districts. Further, the new definition
of "general laws" in Garcia is a difficult barrier to those attempting to chal-
lenge exclusionary local zoning laws since a strict requirement for uniform
operation of state statutes must be shown in order to take advantage of the
conflict provisions of article II, section 26, of the Ohio Constitution.
The Ohio Supreme Court has accomplished a most dubious goal. The
power to determine where, when, and how mentally, physically, or socially
disadvantaged persons shall receive rehabilitative services has been placed
within the control of local government, as opposed to the control of the state's
General Assembly. Local government bodies, with their bias towards insular
concerns, are the least likely to implement uniform and effective rehabilita-
tion programs to help these citizens. While most would agree that the ment-
ally ill or mentally retarded deserve treatment, care, and a decent environ-
ment in which to live, fewer than five communities in the entire state of Ohio
have voluntarily sought to provide the opportunity to obtain treatment in their
communities."
While Saunders represents the first, tentative step toward condemning
the exclusion of foster children facilities from single-family residential dis-
tricts, it does not provide invincible protection from exclusionary zoning.
State and local interests are still juggled under Brownfield. The deinstitution-
alization statutes are still impaired by the Garcia decision. Furthermore, by
drafting a zoning ordinance similar to that found in Belle Terre, local interests
may circumvent any constitutional problems despite the fragile bulwark of
Saunders. While Saunders raises the hope of constitutionally guaranteed
rights that might prohibit exclusionary zoning, the core of its opinion does not
specifically apply legal precedent, and therefore may be dismissed as a deci-
sion influenced by compassion rather than one compelled by legal right.
It is of paramount importance that the decisions of Brownfield, Garcia,
and Carroll be rendered impotent and that such a repudiation be done in a
stronger and more explicit manner than that attempted in Saunders. If the
Ohio courts are hesitant to abolish exclusionary zoning as other jurisdictions
have done, then the state legislature must respond with unequivocal remedial
legislation.
Judith Dippel Trail
183. See note 177 supra.
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